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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent7 
Case No. 
-vs- . 14446 
THERON JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault, 
a violation of Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1975), Section 
76-5-103. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury by the 
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen on the 5th day of January, 
1976, and was found guilty of aggravated assault as 
charged. Appellant was sentenced, after a 90 day 
diagnostic and pre-sentence reporting period, on April 
16, 197 6 to serve less than five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance the conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Jerry Cronin, a BYU student began working 
part-time, as a process server on the first of December, 
1975 (T-10). The next day, December 2, 1975, he went 
to appellant's home to serve a legal paper. Appellant was 
not home. Mr. Cronin spoke with appellant's wife very 
briefly and asked when appellant might be home, then he 
left (T-13). Two days later on December 4, 1975, Mr. 
Cronin again went to appellant's home. Mr. Cronin 
knocked on the door. According to Mr. Cronin, the door 
immediately opened and appellant was standing in the 
door pointing a rifle directly at Mr. Cronin (T-16). 
Mr. Cronin immediately threw his hands up and said, 
"Forget it, sir, I am getting out of here," (T-21). 
Mr. Cronin then started down the driveway with appellant 
chasing him. Appellant reversed his hold on the gun 
(thereby holding the barrel instead of the stock) and 
swung it at Mr. Cronin, but Mr. Cronin ducked (T-21,22). 
Mr. Cronin then got in his car and drove away. 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The information in the present case charged 
appellant as follows: 
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". . . on or about the 4th day of 
December, 1975,• . . [appellant] 
threatened, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to Jerry Cronin by use 
of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.11 
(Record on Appeal, p. 47) 
This language is directly from Utah Code Ann. 
§§76-5-103, and 76-5-102 (Supp. 1975). Appellant 
contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution 
was insufficient to support a conviction for the crime 
of aggravated assault. Respondent submits that an 
examination of the evidence shows every element of the 
crime of aggravated assault was conclusively established. 
Before re-examining the evidence, it is 
important to point out that a jury verdict must stand 
unless it appears that the evidence was so inconclusive 
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds must have 
entered reasonable doubts that the crime was committed. 
State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (I960), 
reaffirmed in State v. Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 499 
P.2d 269 (1972). In other words, the strong presumption 
is that a jury verdict is correct. Appellant, to prevail, 
has the burden to prove that the jury verdict was un-
reasonable and this he has failed to do. 
Furthermore, when evidence is viewed on appeal, 
it is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
-3-
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State v> Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959) 
reaffirmed in State v. Georgeopoulos, 27 Utah 2d 
53, 492 P.2d 1353 (1972). As the Utah Supreme Court 
has said: 
" . . . the correct pattern of 
procedure on appeal. . . is. . . 
to respect the prerogative of 
the jury as the exclusive judges 
of the credibility of the facts. 
Consequently, we assume that they 
believed the State's evidence, and 
we survey [the evidence] together with 
all fair inferences that the jury 
could reasonably draw therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to 
their verdict." State v. Canfield, 
18 Utah 2d 292, 294, 422 P.2d 196 
(1967). 
In order to obtain a conviction, it was necessary 
for the state to prove that appellant: (1) threatened 
to do bodily injury to another; (2) accompanied that 
threat by a show of force or violence; (3) used a 
deadly weapon; and (4) had no lawful justification 
for the threat. It is undisputed by appellant that 
he met Mr. Cronin at the door with his rifle and 
that he chased him off his property with the rifle 
(T-92,93). Therefore, the only remaining questions 
are whether the rifle was a deadly weapon (appellant 
claims that an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon), 
and whether appellant had a lawful right to do what 
he did. Respondent submits that appellant's rifle 
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was a deadly weapon and that appellant had no lawful 
right to act as he did. 
A. A RIFLE IS A DEADLY WEAPON WHETHER LOADED 
OR NOT. 
The Utah Supreme Court held, in State v. Nielson, 
544, P.2d 489 (Utah - 1965) that a rifle or gun is a 
deadly weapon under the meaning of the statutes whether 
it is loaded or not. Therefore, the state has proved 
the element of use of a deadly weapon. No proof is 
needed as to whether or not a bullet was in the rifle. 
Furthermore, even if the rifle was unloaded it would 
still be a deadly weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(a) 
(Supp. 1975), defines a deadly weapon as: 
"Anything that in the manner of 
its use or intended use is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury." 
There is no doubt but that a rifle could be deadly if 
used as a club. Many states that hold that a gun must 
be loaded to be deadly have an exception to that rule 
for guns which could also be used as a club. See 
Hutton v. People, 156 Colo. 334, 398 P.2d 973 (1965), 
People v. Hood, 160 Cal. App.. 2d 121, 324 P.2d 656 
(1958). 
In other words, a gun (pistol or rifle) is a 
deadly weapon whether it is loaded or not if it could 
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effectively be used as a club. In both of the cases 
cited, supra, from California and Colorado, a defendant 
was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon even 
though the weapon was a toy pistol since it could 
still be used as a club. 
Finally, it is important to note that appellant 
in this case, did use the rifle as a club. Mr. Cronin 
testified, as did Mrs. Cronin, that appellant, while 
chasing Mr. Cronin down the driveway, reversed his 
hold on the rifle and holding it by the barrel, took 
a swing at Mr. Croninfs head with it (T-22,40). 
Respondent submits that there is no doubt but that the 
rifle, used by appellant, was a deadly weapon within 
the meaning of the statute. 
B. APPELLANT HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO DO WHAT 
HE DID. 
Appellant argues that he is innocent of the 
crime of aggravated assault since, he claims, he has 
a legal right to defend his property and possessions. 
Appellant also claims innocence because he believed 
that Mr. Cronin might harm his family or property. 
In Utah the applicable statutes are Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-2-405 and 76-2-406 (Supp. 1975). Section 
7 6-2-4 06 justifies the use of force by one man against 
-6-
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another if the first man reasonably believes that the 
second is criminally interfering with the first man's 
real property. That section, however, is completely 
inapplicable to the present case since it only 
justifies the use of "force, other than deadly force." 
In the instant case, appellant used deadly force 
and so can not claim justification through the statute. 
Additionally, appellant had absolutely no reason to 
believe Mr. Cronin was interfering with his property. 
Section 76-2-405 justifies the use of force, 
including deadly force by one man against another 
if the first man reasonably believes that the other 
is making or attempting to make an unlawful entry 
or attack upon the first man's house. However, this 
section is also unavailable to appellant as justification 
for his actions. The deadly force may not be used 
unless the other man attempted to enter the home in 
a "violent and tumiltuous manner." There is absolutely 
no evidence at all that Mr. Cronin attempted to 
enter appellant's home in a violent or tumiltuous 
manner or that he attempted to do any harm to appellant's 
property or family. Mr. Cronin was there to serve 
a legal paper on appellant. Since appellant had 
no justification for what he did, his conviction should 
be affirmed. 
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Appellant made two other arguments which 
can be answered briefly. He claims that assault 
is an attempt to do injury to another and that he 
did not "attempt" but only "threatened." This 
argument shows complete ignorance of the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (b) (Supp. 1975), plainly 
states that: 
"Assault is a threat. . • to do 
bodily injury to another." (Emphasis 
added) 
Appellant also cites a 1845 North Carolina case for 
the proposition that the law makes allowances for 
the angry passions and infirmities of man. Respondent 
submits that in 197 6 the law in Utah is not the same 
as it may have been in North Carolina in 1845. 
There is no excuse, under the Utah Code, for a man 
to point a rifle at another and then swing it at 
the other man's head, simply because he does not 
want to be served a legal paper. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that, all elements of the 
crime being proved, and no justification existing for 
appellant's conduct, appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
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